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RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND THE EPISTEMIC
JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
Jerome Gellman

There exists a diversity of "evidence-free" religions, contradicting one another. There will be an epistemic problem for a religious devotee either
because evidence-free belief is in general not epistemically justified in the
face of diversity, or because of a special problem in the religious case. I argue
that in general evidence-free belief is epistemically justified in the face of
diversity. Then I argue that recent arguments of Wykstra and Basinger fail to
show that there is a special problem in the religious case. Finally, I give
reasons why religious belief is epistemically justified in the face of diversity.
Humankind knows a diversity of "religions" or "religious traditions," by
which I shall mean sets of religious beliefs with associated religious practises.
We shall assume that no devotees of a religion R, can show, by means which
do not already make assumptions peculiar to R, that R is true or "more true"
than other religions. Accordingly, let us call the religious beliefs in R evidence-free relative to other religions (or simply, evidence-free), in the sense
that either they are not based on evidence at all, or if based on evidence, one
could not show that the evidence was adequate without making some of the
assumptions of R itself.
Let us call the state of affairs so far described, religious diversity. I wish
to discuss whether religious diversity renders religious belief cpistcmically
defective or unacceptable within the family of human doxastic practises. If
it does, and if a religious devotee became aware of the defectiveness of his
belief on that account, his belief would be irrational.
Now it may be that the believer cannot help but believe. But there may be
steps he could take in an attempt to dislodge adherence to religious belief.
He could at least adopt an attitude toward religion that reflects an acknowledgement of its irrationality. And this would surely have an impact on the
manner in which he applied his religion to daily life, and on his relations with
adherents of other religions.'

I
In what follows I wish to focus on one feature of religious diversity: the fact
that many beliefs, including the most central ones, of one religious tradition
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are inconsistent with those, including the most central ones, of other religious
tradi tions.
For example, S believes in the existence of an infinite God, creator of
heaven and earth, while S 1 believes in a God who is subject to eternal laws
of reality. Or, S believes the Messiah has already come, whereas S 1 believes
the Messiah is yet to come, or denies, in the name of S 1's tradition, that there
is an earthly Messiah. Or: S believes that what survives this life to a next life
is an essential self, or Atman, identical to Brahman, whereas S 1 believes that
what survives "this life" is only a nexus of "conditioning" that causally gives
rise to a new constellation of body and mind, structurally similar to, while
numerically distinct from, one in a previous existence.
There seem to be two possible ways in which contradictions between traditions may generate an epistemic problem for the religious devotee: Because:
(I)

Any instance of contradictions between evidence-free beliefs epistemically delegitimizes those beliefs.

or
(2) In the religious case in particular contradictions between evidence-free
beliefs delegitimize those beliefs.

Let us consider (1) and (2) in turn.
That (1) has little force is shown by examples of some of our most cherished
beliefs that are evidence-free and contradict beliefs in other doxastic traditions, while being, surely, epistemically adequate. Take our widely shared
belief that democratic government is superior to other extant forms of government, past and present. And consider the contradictory belief, still held at
least in China, that communist dictatorship surpasses democracy as a superior
form of government.
Now perhaps an argument could be mounted for democracy that would not
beg any relevant questions in its favor. Perhaps we could agree with our
opponents on certain values or goods that we all want to see exhibited in
society, and then convince them that our democratic position would best
enhance the realization of those values or goods.
But suppose our belief in democracy expressed for us a cluster of fundamental political and ethical values, and that the other side's communism
expressed for them a most basic cluster of values. Or, supposing agreement
on some values, imagine that these different traditions disagreed fundamentally on the relative weights to be given to each value. We could argue, let
us imagine, that democracy enhanced individual freedoms and protection
from arbitrary arrest, much better than does communism, but find that the
values we were building on were not recognized by the other side, or were
recognized as values of a lesser sort. In either case, we would find no way
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to argue without begging the question at issue in favor of the values, and their
weights, which are peculiarly part of the democratic tradition.
If such were the case, our belief in democracy would be evidence-free, in
the above defined sense. But it seems quite obvious that we would be perfectly entitled to believe in democracy, even if evidence-free, and even if
contradicted by the beliefs of others.
The fact is that many of our most cherished beliefs are shared only by those
who share our cultural, geographical, ethnic or educational background. And
often these beliefs are both evidence-free as well as contradicted by other
orientations.
Cherished beliefs of this sort are not limited to morals and politics, and
religion. Consider an example involving an existence claim, that is an evidence-free belief, and which we recognize as epistemically proper. Some
mathematicians think of sets as mere constructs useful for the mathematical
life. They do not posit their existence. Other mathematicians believe that sets
exist, and their whole way of doing mathematics is accordingly affected. They
do so without a non question-begging argument that shows them to be right
and their opponents wrong, although they can give themselves various reasons
for their belief. It would appear that their belief is not irrational in the least.
Hence, if there is a problem from religious diversity on account of contradictions between the beliefs of one tradition and another, it does not come
from being an instance of doxastic diversity in general.
Let us now consider:
(2) In the religious case in particular contradictions between evidence-free
beliefs delegitimize those beliefs.

A most serious challenge to the epistemic acceptability of religious belief
on account of features of religious diversity, in particular, has been made by
Stephen J. Wykstra. 2 A similar argument has been put forward by David
Basinger, and is intimated in the writings of John Hick. 3 Here we will concentrate on the arguments of Wykstra and Basinger, respectively.
Wykstra argues that religious belief is what he calls "evidence essential,"
meaning that unless evidence for the belief is available to the community of
believers, the belief is epistemically defective. 4 In so saying, Wykstra does
not mean that each believer must know or be aware of the evidence, but that
the evidence must be known within the believer's community. This is a
"communitarian" sense of "having evidence." For example, each of us
needn't know or even be capable of understanding the scientific evidence for
the belief that electrons exist in order for the latter to be epistemically acceptable for each of us. It is enough that the experts have that evidence.
If it should turn out, however, that even for the scientists there was no
evidence for our belief in electrons, our belief would be epistemically defec-
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tive, whether we knew it or not. Were we to become aware of the lack of
evidence, and were then to continue believing in electrons, we would be
irrational in doing so. The belief in electrons is thus evidence-essential, for
Wykstra. And he argues that so is religious belief.
Wykstra's argument for the latter conclusion begins by following Thomas
Reid, in maintaining that we are endowed with what Wykstra calls "basic
faculties," such as the senses, memory, credulity, and logical intuition,
through whose use we form beliefs. 5 Beliefs formed via these natural faculties
are not inferentially accessed. Rather, we naturally and unreflectively accept
them in the course of employing these faculties. For example, I do not accept
a law of logic because of an inference to the effect that it seems logically
intuitive and what seems logically intuitive is most likely true. Instead I
simply believe the law, via the faculty of logical intuition.
Reid and Wykstra insist we are perfectly within our epistemic rights to rely
on our basic faculties. We need not infer that there is a tree in front of us, or
that 2+2=4, or that we were once in Paris. We are epistemically justified in
believing these things straightaway, upon the functioning of the appropriate
faculty.
When our basic faculties present conflicting results, however, we face what
Wykstra caBs "ostensible epistemic parity."6 In ostensible epistemic parity
we become obligated according to Wykstra to find evidence of an inferential
type which will allow us to discriminate between the belief, formed by our
natural faculties, that's to be trusted, and that belief formed by our natural
faculties that's to be rejected. Epistemic parity "blocks the flow," in Wykstra's
words, of our natural disposition to accept what we believe via our faculties.
Discriminational evidence frees up that blockage, by either confirming one
side, or disconfirming one side. In either case, the result is an unblocking of
the natural flow of credulity toward the remaining belief-candidate. 7
To illustrate, consider our disposition to trust the testimony of others, a
basic faculty for Reid and Wykstra. Suppose my father tells me one thing,
and my mother something inconsistent with that. This creates ostensible
epistemic parity, blocking the natural disposition and the epistemic right to
trust the testimonies of my mother and father. What is needed to restore the
epistemic right to believe one or another of the testimonies is evidence for
or against one of the parental assertions. Initially, testimony could be believed
in the absence of evidence, because of the basic faculty of forming beliefs
based on the testimony of others. But now without evidence I would remain
in ostensible epistemic parity.
To summarize, epistemic parity makes evidence essentially a condition of
epistemic propriety.
Wykstra embraces the view that religious belief initially requires no evidence of the derivational kind to be epistemically upright. That is because
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human beings have a basic faculty for belief-formation, we migm call the
"religious faculty." In appropriate circumstances, this faculty gives non-derivational religious beliefs in an epistemically acceptable way. One need not
derive, say, the existence of God from an experience of Him, any more than
one derives the existence of the tree from seeing it. In both cases one simply
believes on having the appropriate experiences.
When we consider religious diversity, however, the situation changes. According to Wykstra, religious diversity epistemically resembles conflict in
testimony, demanding discriminational evidence for the favoring of one religion over others, so as to eliminate blockage of the natural reliance upon
the religious faculty.s Wykstra concludes that "insofar as such parity problems
are pervasive, there is reason to regard experiential religious beliefs as needing evidence of (at least) the discriminational kind."9 So, because of religious
diversity religious belief is evidence essential, meaning that (discriminational) evidence for that belief must be available to the community of believers. Hence, on our assumption that religious beliefs are evidence-free,
religious beliefs are epistemically defective.
An argument somewhat similar to Wykstra's has been put forward by David
Basinger. Basinger attacks what he calls the "General Reliability Argument,"
(GRA), in light of religious diversity. (GRA) is characterized as follows:
We as humans are naturally endowed with a considerable number of beliefforming faculties .... The assumed reliability of such facuIties serves as the
basis for some of our most non-controversial examples of 'knowledge.' So
our basic stance toward such facuIties-including our religious facultiesshould be to assume they are 'innocent until proven gUilty.' 10
Basinger wishes to disallow the GRA when it comes to the faculty of forming
religious beliefs:
Pervasive religious diversity brings into serious question whether we ought
consider religious faculties to be analogous to other belief-forming faculties
in the way GRA suggests .... since the reason we do not question the reliability of most of our faculties is that such faculties consistently generate similar
beliefs in most individuals, the fact that religious faculties do not, in general,
produce similar beliefs in similar contexts does make it much more difficult
to assume they possess the same sort of reliability status I I
Basinger calls into question the very reliability of the religious faculty,
whereas Wykstra focused on the epistemic obligation to determine by evidence which of the contradictory religious beliefs deserves credence. The
more local and uncommon the phenomenon of epistemic parity for a particular faculty, the more is the problem one of selecting one of the contradictory
beliefs for credence. The more pervasive and unresisting cases of epistemic
parity for a particular faculty, the more reason we would have to doubt its
very reliability. Religious epistemic parity might well display a pervasiveness
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and entrenchment which would qualify it as a candidate for the second type
of problem.
Basinger believes that religious diversity also defeats a principle he calls
the Negative Apologetical Thesis (NAT), which goes as follows:
For a theist to be in a position to maintain justifiably that her basic formed
beliefs are true even though she has no "positive reason" to think they are
true, she is only obligated to defend herself against the claim that her religious
faculties are not functioning properly.12

Basinger, in opposition to NAT, claims that "religious diversity does challenge the assumption that a theist need only defend her formed beliefs and
the reliability of the faculties which have produced them," in order to continue to believe without positive evidence. 13 He writes:
The knowledgeable theist is obligated to attempt to resolve the pluralistic
conflict-enter the arena of positive apologetics-before any 'final' decision
concerning the epistemic status of her formed religious belief can be made. 14

For both Wykstra and Basinger, therefore, it is religious diversity that
would make religious belief epistemically defective if evidence-free.
I now want to argue that the position of Wykstra, and of Basinger, IS
unacceptable" for three major reasons:
1.

Their position has unwanted epistemological consequences.

2.

The religious faculty does not generally function in the way they suppose.

3.

Their conception of epistemology is too narrow.

1. If we accept that there are faculties for forming religious beliefs, beliefs
of logic, and sense beliefs, we should acknowledge a faculty, as well, by
means of which we form moral and value beliefs. After all, we form moral
and value beliefs just as naturally and unreflectively as some form religious
beliefs. And we are just as familiar with the notion of a "moral intuition" as
we are with the notion of a religious experience or a logical intuition. I
conclude that we ought to recognize a faculty for forming moral or value
beliefs, if we recognize other natural faculties.
Consider now, our belief in democracy. Most of us who hold this belief do
so non-inferentially, via the natural faculty for forming value beliefs. Similarly, those who believe in a non-democratic system may plausibly be said to
be exercising the very same faculty. Conceding this, and noting the pervasiveness and entrenched nature of the contradiction between champions of
democracy and their opponents, Basinger ought to call into question the
reliability of the faculty for forming value beliefs.
At the least we should get epistemic parity with regard to our value faculty.
And then our belief in democracy should be judged epistemically defective,
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unless there were available to the community of believers in democracy
non-question begging discriminational evidence in their favor.
This consequence seems deeply counter-intuitive. If true, then if it should
turn out that no one, not even our best political theorists, had any evidence
(in the sense appropriate to value inquiry) favoring democracy, that did not
draw exclusively from the cluster of values that only a believer in democracy
would recognize or give similar weight to in the first place, then our belief
in democracy would be epistemically defective. And knowing this, we would
be epistemically irrational to continue believing in democracy. That this is
not true seems to me obvious. Our belief in democracy would not be evidence-essential, even if evidence-free under conditions of epistemic parity.
Similar implausible conclusions follow from considering any number of
beliefs which figure in debate over public policy. On the view we are considering, no one would be epistemically entitled to endorse a pro-or con-abortion point of view, or a belief for or against capital punishment. Presumably,
sophisticated holders of any of these positions could justify it with a whole
cluster of beliefs about humanity, justice, and the value of life. But their
opponents could invoke against them an equally ramified cluster of values.
Neither side, it seems, can produce a non question-begging argument. These
beliefs are thus evidence-free relative to the opposition, and thus allegedly
epistemically defecti ve.
An additional problem with the approach of Wykstra and Basinger regards
the nature of the religious faculty. If I understand Wykstra and Basinger
correctly, one who formed an atheistic or an agnostic belief in a natural,
unreflective way, would not be considered to have employed a religious
faculty in so doing. This is indicated by the fact that in their discussions of
the beliefs formed via the religious faculty, both Wykstra and Basinger confine themselves exclusively to conflicts between religious beliefs. This suggests that in their view the forming of an atheistic or agnostic belief is not
the product of the religious faculty.
Why should a belief that God exists be the product of one faculty, and the
belief that God does not exist a product of a different faculty?
Perhaps the idea is that the formation of beliefs via a religious faculty is
the result of religious experience, and not merely an intuition or conviction
formed via an appropriate belief-forming mechanism. The formation of atheistic and agnostic beliefs is not based on religious experiences at all. So
different faculties must be acknowledged.
However, the difference between a Christian experience of God, for example, and a Buddhist experience of nothingness, is not impressively less than
the difference between the Christian experience and an experience, say, of
looking at the starry heavens and, impressed by the sheer meaninglessness
of it all, declaring there is no God. It is arbitrary to assign the Christian and
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Buddhist experiences to one faculty, and the above atheistic experience to
another. More plausibly, all three experiences are varying forms of a single
faculty for forming beliefs on spiritual matters, on the basis of our experiences of the world.
It might be objected, though, that atheistic (and agnostic) beliefs are rarely
the result of experiences of the sort described above. They are mostly the
result of other belief-forming faculties or are the result of inferences, correct
or not, from other beliefs.
This objection would be completed by the claim that normally, religious
belief is the result of religious experience, and not of some other belief-forming mechanism, nor the result of an inference from other beliefs. And that is
why a distinct religious faculty must be recognized.
This claim about the manner in which religious belief is normally formed
will be rejected below. It should be noted now, however. that atheistic and
agnostic belief can issue from some natural faculty or other. even if not the
same faculty for religious belief. Beliefs of this kind are at least sometimes
formed in that unreflective and immediate way which indicates that a basic
faculty is at work. But once this is acknowledged. the arguments of Wykstra
and Basinger would have the quite implausible consequence that because of
religious/agnostic/atheistic diversity. no belief about the existence or non-existence of God could be held in an epistemically justified way. And that would
be because of epistemic parity between the results of different faculties, and
the ensuing threat to the reliability of each of the faculties involved. After
all, parity between faculties should be a no less potent epistemic threat than
parity that arises within the confines of the employment of a single faculty.
If our sense of sight and sense of touch were seriously and regularly at odds
in their testimony to us. the problems raised by Wykstra and Basinger would
surely arise there, if they arose anywhere.
If the line of argument being scrutinized were correct. no one could form
any epistemically justified beliefs about any religious matter about which
there existed a diversity of belief, without running afoul of the prohibition
upon relying on a faculty. when faced with epistemic parity.
Furthermore. neither could judgement be suspended. for the reason that a
faculty is involved in judging that belief should be suspended. This would be
the faculty of forming epistemic judgements or perhaps the faculty of reasoning. And this faculty must be weighed against the faculty that says that
God exists. and against the faculty that says God does not exist. So the very
faculty employed to decide that judgement should be suspended, would itself
be a party to epistemic parity (Wykstra) or be threatened by the loss of its
reliability (Basinger).
To my mind. these results count strongly against the epistemological assumptions of Wykstra and Basinger.
2. The religious faculty does not widely function in the way implied by
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Wykstra and Basinger. We should here distinguish between: (A) the initial
formulation of religious belief in a believer, and (B) the ongoing creation of
religious beliefs in the life of a believer.
(A) pertains to the way in which a believer comes to have religious beliefs
in the first place (early on in life, say). These may be beliefs held by a general
population, such as that God has revealed His Law to His people. Or they
may be of a more personal and specific nature, held solely by a single believer
or together with those close to her, such as that God loved Uncle Randolph,
or that God "wants me to go to sleep now."
(B) pertains to the ongoing creation of religious beliefs as the religious life
is lived, and may include the adding on of generally held beliefs, but more
typically will pertain to the personal type of belief, such as that God "wants
me now to act in a certain way."
With regard to (A), it seems quite apparent that the vast majority of religious believers in the world's religious traditions do not come to their beliefs
via a religious faculty. Rather, they are born and raised within a religious
tradition with which they simply go along. They are led by their elders and
teachers to act and speak in certain ways, and they just go along with it. This
is also the way they get their beliefs about geography, history, literature,
music, science, and much else. They then continue along with their beliefs
once they have them. If anything, a faculty of credulity in testimony of others
lies at the beginning of their religiosity. At that beginning, in any case, often
lies an intricate network of dogma and doctrine which it is quite implausible
to suppose believers come to via a religious faculty. They believe what they
are taught by their elders.
With regard to (B), later beliefs, again it seems quite apparent that these
religious beliefs are not generally formed in a fashion suggesting the operation of a religious faculty. Rather, believers typically are drawing conclusions
from the religious framework they have been taught, applying it to the circumstances in which they find themselves.
This procedure is quite unlike the formation of sense-beliefs. For while
individuals do see objects with the obvious aid of an acculturated practise,
yet in doing so they normally do not draw any conclusions from previously
acquired sense-beliefs. Their formation of sense-beliefs when confronted by
physical objects is direct and spontaneous. With religion, however, it seems
that after the initial period of acculturation, believers are typically only drawing upon the beliefs within their tradition to form inferences concerning their
present life situations.
There may be exceptions to this in some religious traditions, but these are not
typical of the way the world's religions work for their adherents in general. In
particular, talk of a religious faculty as the source of religious beliefs, rather
than the faculties of credulity in testimony and of reasoning, seems largely
inappropriate to contemporary Jewish religious belief. Religious belief has
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much more to do with living within a tradition and drawing inferences within
it, than with forming unreflective beliefs via a uniquely religious facuity.
3. My major objection to Wykstra and Basinger is that their epistemology
is too narrow to correctly reflect the epistemology of religion.
The implicit conception of epistemology shared by these two thinkers is
that one's epistemology consists exclusively in the discovery and accurate
formulation of rules governing beliefs. That is to say, on this view epistemology is solely a matter of finding the right rules and applying them correctly
to specific beliefs.
By a rule I mean a(n implicitly or explicitly) universally quantified proposition which states under what conditions one is justified in taking a proposition as true, or in believing it, or in taking it to be rational to believe it; or
which sets out one's epistemic obligations with regard to one's given
epistemic situation.
To illustrate, Wykstra and Basinger employ the following epistemic rules
in their discussions:
(1) One is justified in believing the testimony of one's natural faculties

unless one has reason not to.
(2) When there is epistemic parity one is obligated to find discriminational
evidence for one side or the other.
(3) It is not rational to believe without evidence or without relying on one's
natural faculties.

The history of epistemology has largely been the history of such rules. Here
are some favorites of various philosophers, past and present:
(4) If a proposition appears to one to be self-evident, then one is justified
in believing it.
(5) It is irrational to believe in a contradiction.
(6) One has an obligation never to believe without evidence.
(7)

One has an obligation to form one's judgements on the basis of one's
total evidence.

These rules (and others like them) are offered as rock-bottom governors of
our epistemic lives: they determine the acceptability of belief candidates,
while themselves not subject to deeper epistemic justification. In the event
that an epistemic rule is derived, and not itself rock-bottom, typically what
appears at the rock-bottom level of the derivation is only other rules. Let us
call any epistemology which recognizes only rules as ultimate in judging
propositions a "rule-epistemology."
By a "religious epistemology," I shall mean an epistemological point of
view used to govern one's religious beliefs. And what I want to claim is that
typically a religious epistemology is not a rule-epistemology.
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However one has formed a religious belief, at some point along the way it
acquires epistemic unconditionality. One's religious beliefs become the very
rock-bottom of one's epistemological apparatus. The epistemic acceptability
of other beliefs is then judged by their lights. The grounds of religious belief,
if any, fall away, leaving a religious belief whose epistemic acceptability is
underived for the believer.
It is in the nature of the religious life, I contend, that religious belief
typically serves the believer not as what is justified, but only as justifying.
Consider the belief that God exists. Whether belief-candidates are acceptable
or not is judged, in part, in light of whether they are consistent with God's
existence. And this is done not because one is or means to be following a
rule, about, say, relying on beliefs for which one has evidence, or because
one is or means to be following a rule about, say, being justified in relying
on natural faculties which deliver beliefs. Rather, belief in God, being rockbottom, plays the role for the believer of a test for other beliefs, in precisely
the way purported for (1)-(7).
Generally, (1)-(7), are accepted as starting points of one's epistemology.
And so, typically, I contend, belief in God belongs with the starting points of the
epistemology of the religious believer, at the same level of epistemological
significance for her as any of the rock-bottom rules of philosophers for them. IS
Now one may object that religious belief as I understand it can be given
the form of a rule. For example, "God exists" as a rock-bottom justifying
proposition, can be cast as follows:
(G) Any proposition which contradicts God's existence is to be rejected.

But if so, the epistemology of religious belief has not been shown to diverge
in any way from rule-epistemology.
But this objection is easily answered. For the proposed rule, (G) is not itself
rock-bottom in the believer's epistemology. For (G) derives from the non-rule
belief that God exists. What is significant about the religious case is that the
specific proposition that God exists (as well as other specific religious propositions) plays an exclusively grounding or judging role in one's epistemology.
Whether or not one originally grounded one's belief in God, subsequently
that belief does not function as a grounded belief but only as a grounding
one. Traditional epistemology has reserved this role for rules alone.
Alternatively, we may concede that (G) functions for the believer in the
rock-bottom way that rules (1)-(7) do for epistemologists. Then I need only
revise my position by saying that rule (G) is to be found in the rock-bottom
of the typical believer's epistemology. My point would then be that in the
believer's epistemology are to be found rules not found in the epistemology
of non-believers, for example (G). In what follows I will prefer the first reply
though: that (G) is not rock-bottom, but derived from the belief that God
exists, which is rock-bottom. 16
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A second point about a typical believer's epistemology depends on the
notion of a hierarchy of rock-bottom propositions. Propositions are epistemically rock-bottom in virtue of not being derived from any other proposition.1 7
There can still be a hierarchy of such propositions in one's epistemology,
though. A rock-bottom proposition, p, will be said to be hierarchically higher
in a hierarchy, H, than is rock-bottom q in H, when p is allowed more weight
than q in one's epistemic deliberations. And p is allowed more weight than
q when the results of applying p are preferred to the results of applying q.
Finally let us say that p is hierarchically prior to q in H, when the result of
applying p is accepted irregardless of what the results are of applying q, that
is, when the application of q is not allowed to change the result yielded by
the application of p.
Generally, the rule that tells us to trust our senses, (S), is hierarchically
higher than the rule that tells us to trust the testimony of others, (T); but (S)
is not prior to (T). The rule that we not believe in an explicit contradiction
is prior to both (S) and (T).
For most of us, (S) is both higher and prior in our hierarchy of epistemic
rock-bottom propositions than the rule that we are justified in believing what
seems true as the conclusion of a sound logical deduction. For that reason,
we do not allow Zeno-like arguments to influence in the least the degree to
which we believe in motion.
Typically, I wish to maintain, religious belief, or at least some substantial
core thereof, which is rock-bottom, is prior in the believer's epistemic hierarchy to many of the rules favored by epistemologists. In particular religious
belief is prior to consideration of rules of rationality. Let us say, then, that
religious belief is possessed of strong priority in a religious epistemology.
Issues of rationality, I wish to claim, against Wykstra's and Basinger's
approach, find a place in a religious epistemology, if at all, posterior to the
acceptance of religious belief. Only already armed with rock-bottom religious
beliefs as jUdging-propositions does the believer ever raise questions of the
rationality of other beliefs. In particular, the believer's rules of rationality are
not applied to her rock-bottom religious beliefs. The latter are prior to the
former for her, in the way that our belief in motion is prior for us to our
acceptance of the conclusions of Zeno's arguments.
It should be noted that a religious epistemology which includes rock-bottom
religious beliefs with strong epistemic priority is not a fideism, for the following reasons:
First, fideism asserts that one may believe "on faith," without support from
"reason." So fideism involves an epistemological rule. However, a believer
for whom belief in God is rock-bottom and possessed of strong hierarchical
priority is simply a Christian, or a Shaivite, with no epistemological rule
justifying her belief, and with no rule that states the conditions of justification
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of religious beliefs in general (whether hers or someone else's). She simply
believes her religion straight-away, evaluating other beliefs directly in terms
of the specific religious beliefs she holds. That's it.
Secondly, fideism includes a view about how believers come to hold their
religious beliefs. They do so on faith. The thesis I am presenting recognizes
that believers come to their beliefs in various ways, though I have claimed
that most are simply raised in a religious atmosphere and go along with it.
My claim is that as religious belief typically functions, the grounds, if any,
for belief fall away, as it were, and religious beliefs become rock-bottom
epistemic propositions, no longer vulnerable to assessment, but instead the
starting points of assessment. 18
Likewise, we should not conclude that an epistemology of rock-bottom
strongly-prior religious beliefs requires a unique conception of "rationality"
on the part of the believer. For the believer may not have any conception of
rationality whatsoever. In particular, if my description of a typical religious
epistemology is correct, the believer does not accept his religious beliefs
because he thinks they are rational. They are epistemically proper for him
not because of satisfying a rule of rationality for him. They are acceptable
for him on account of being the propositions that they are.
I conclude that typical religious epistemology differs markedly from the
picture presented in the arguments of Wykstra and Basinger. 19

II
I have argued that a typical religious epistemology regards religious beliefs,
or at least a core thereof, as epistemically rock-bottom and strongly prior in
the hierarchy of epistemically rock-bottom propositions.
In this section I argue that such an epistemology is quite proper, and that
no epistemic problem need arise for the believer on account of religious
diversity. I begin by considering two objections to the position given in
section I. Then I consider the status of such an epistemology when faced with
opposing epistemological viewpoints.
The first objection is that a religious epistemology of the sort described violates
the notion of "epistemic justification." The second objection is that if such an
epistemology were approved, then "anyone could believe anything they wanted."
The first objection begins by asserting an intrinsic connection between
"epistemic justification" and "truth." Laurence Bonjour has put the point
about the connection in the following way:
The distinguishing characteristic of epistemic justification is thus its essential
or internal relation to the cognitive role of truth. It follows that one's cognitive endeavors are epistemically justified only if and to the extent that they
are aimed at this goal, which means very roughly that one accepts all and
only those beliefs which one has good reason to think are true. To accept a
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belief in the absence of such a reason .. .is to neglect the pursuit of truth; such
acceptance is, one might say, epistemically irresponsible. [So] any degree of
epistemic justification, however small, must increase to a commensurate
degree the chances that the belief in question is true ... for otherwise it cannot
qualify as epistemic justification at all. 2o

Bonjour seems to be endorsing the following principle:
(B) S is epistemically justified in believing a proposition, p, if and only if
S has good reason to think that p is true.

Contrary to (B), however, there are beliefs epistemically justified in the
absence of reasons for thinking the belief true. It seems most rational, everything else being equal, to continue believing what one already believes, until
one has a reason to abandon that belief, even if presently there is no reason
for thinking the belief true. 21 This is true even when the belief in question is
challenged by counter-beliefs. This is sometimes called the principle of
"methodological conservatism." So we see that epistemic justification does
not depend on having reasons to think true. 22
It may be argued, though, that even so methodological conservatism is
epistemically justified in reference to truth, even if not indicative of the truth
of propositions, because the pursuit of truth is best served in the long run by
adoption of the principle. If people were to follow the rule of methodological
conservatism, they would be more motivated to attempt to find evidence for
the propositions they held than they would if they merely entertained those
propositions without believing them. The increased effort to try to establish
the truth of propositions serves the cause of truth in the long run. 23 And so,
the argument concludes, the principle of methodological conservatism is justified, at least, with "respect" to truth: while it may not serve to indicate truth,
it helps yield truth, in the long run.
Allowing this reply to stand, let us change (B) accordingly:
(B 1) S is epistemically justified in believing a proposition, p, if and only if
either S has good reason to think that p is true, or S has good reason
to think that believing p will serve the pursuit of truth in the long run.

Accepting (B 1), however, does not require rejecting a non-rule religious
epistemology. To see this, consider that (B I) will entail this only if read as:
(B2) S is epistemically justified in believing a proposition, p, if and only if
either S has good reason to think that p is true in virtue of having tested
p in accordance with epistemically valid rules, or S has good reason
independent of thinking that p is true to think that believing p will
serve the pursuit of truth in the long run.

But one can accept (BI), with its disjunctive link between epistemic justification and truth, without endorsing (B2), by adopting a non-rule epistemology. In a non-rule epistemology, S's having good reason to think that p is
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true, is not equivalent to S's having a good reason to think that p is true in
virtue of having tested p by epistemically valid rules. And in a non rule-epistemology that S has good reason to think that believing p serves truth in the
long run, is not equivalent to S having good reason independent of thinking
that p is true to think that believing p serves truth in the long run.
A non rule-epistemology does require the rejection of (B2), but not the
rejection of (B l). A non rule-epistemologist can embrace (B 1) with enthusiasm. If there is a link between epistemic justification and truth it is purely
formal, and does not entail a substantive claim about what are good reasons
for thinking that p is true or for thinking that believing p will serve truth in
the long run. The non-rule epistemologist is free, as far as (BI) is concerned,
to think of the reasons for thinking p true or for thinking the belief in p as
conducive to truth, as internal to the act of accepting p.
Let me illustrate the point with the belief that God exists, as rock-bottom
and possessed of strong priority.
As for the link between epistemic justification and having a good reason
for thinking that God exists is true, the believer who believes that God exists
and who holds this belief in a rock-bottom way might well be prepared to
insist that he holds it because it is true. If asked what his reason is for thinking
that it is true, he could well answer that the reason he thinks it is true is just
because it is true. He neither derives this belief from any other belief of his
nor recognizes an epistemic duty to justify the truth of this belief by means
of rules which pass upon its acceptability.
The situation of the believer would thus not be dissimilar to that of the
epistemologist who accepts the rule listed earlier:
(4) If a proposition appears to one to be self-evident, then one is justified
in believing it.

The epistemologist would no doubt claim that his reason for thinking that (4)
true is that it seems true. But suppose we wished him to make explicit his
reason for thinking that if (4) seems true, then it is true. 24 Plausibly, our
epistemologist would answer that:
(4a) If a proposition seems true, that's a good reason to think it is true.

But then if we ask what reason he has for thinking (4a) true, he cannot reply
that he thinks that it is true is because it seems to be true, without begging
the question at issue. The only real recourse the epistemologist seems to have
is to say that the reason he thinks (4a) true is just that it is true. His reason
for accepting the truth of (4a) is thus internal to his acceptance of (4a). He
is nonetheless epistemically justified in accepting (4a). 25 The belief that God
exists would be similar for the believer to the belief in (4) or (4a) for the
epistemologist. The reason for thinking that each is true belongs internally
to the acceptance of the proposition in question.
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Next, regarding epistemic justification and the serving of truth in the long
run, a believer can readily proclaim that the holding of his belief furthers the
cause of truth in the long run. This will be because he attests that God exists
is true, so judging other beliefs by whether they contradict that belief will
serve the cause of truth in the long run. To suppose that such a procedure
violates (B 1) is to smuggle into (B 1) substantive epistemological doctrines
not justified on the mere grounds of a conceptual link between epistemic
justification and truth.
The point is that accepting (B 1) does not require that the reason for thinking
that what one believes is true or serves the cause of truth must be decided
independently of and prior to the acceptance of the belief itself. (B 1) does
not entail (B2). It follows that ceding the disjunctive link between epistemic
justification and truth does not disqualify a religious epistemology which is
not a rule-epistemology.
The second objection to religious epistemology as I have presented it that I wish
to consider is this: If religious belief, epistemically rock-bottom and strongly prior,
were recognized as epistemically proper, then couldn't just any belief claim
the same right? Wouldn't the door be open for out and out irrationality?
This objection parallels an objection considered by Alvin Plantinga to his
thesis that religious belief is properly basic. 26 I paraphrase Plantinga's voicing
of the objection, substituting "rock-bottom and has strong epistemic priority"
for each occurrence of "properly basic:"
If belief in God is rock-bottom and has strong epistemic priority, why cannot
just any belief be rock-bottom and have strong epistemic priority? Could we
not say the same for any bizarre aberration we can think of? What about
voodoo or astrology? What about the belief that the Great Pumpkin returns
every Halloween? Could I properly take that as rock-bottom and as having
strong epistemic priority?27

The first thing to be said in response is that this issue need not arise for a
religious epistemology. And that is because a religious epistemology need not
have any rule to the effect that any belief can be rock-bottom and strongly
prior. A religious epistemology may explicitly reject such a rule, recognizing
only particular religious beliefs as rock-bottom and strongly prior. Neither,
from the point of view of such an epistemology, is a rule required to distinguish the favored religious beliefs from other possible candidates for proper
rock-bottom strong priority. And that is because the religious beliefs are
rock-bottom and strongly prior epistemically, thus not dependent upon passing the test of any rule. The religious beliefs may securely be in place before,
as it were, the rationality of voodoo and astrology are ever considered. So
from the point of view of a religious epistemology there need be no problem
created by the asking of the above questions.
The above questions only arise from the point of view of a rule-epistemology,
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which grants epistemic respectability only to beliefs that pass the test of
epistemic rules. And the question asked from that point of view is: by what
rule are rock-bottom strongly prior religious beliefs to be epistemically justified?
The rule that any belief of that sort can be epistemically justified is obviously
unacceptable. But what could distinguish the religious case from others?
A possible suggestion emerges from considering Plantinga's choice of belief in the "Great Pumpkin," as an example of a paradigmatic ally unacceptable belief. Now the fact is that a belief in the Great Pumpkin who returns
every Halloween bears a striking similarity to beliefs current in the world's
great religions. In some sects of Buddhism, for example, Buddha figures are
said to appear and reappear to the inner eye of the devotee. Devout Jews
believe that the prophet Elijah returns to their homes every Passover, and
attends every Jewish circumcision. And Christianity has taught that a man
who died and was buried long ago reappears regularly in substance upon the
partaking of wine and wafer under proper circumstances.
Of course each of these beliefs is embedded within a larger theological
context. But couldn't we imagine the same for belief in the Great Pumpkin?
I don't see why not. So what, indeed, makes the Great Pumpkin, but not
Transubstantiation or Elijah's annual visits, a fine example of an obviously
unacceptable belief?
I suggest that a felt difference between the religious cases and the Great
Pumpkin example is that the former and not the latter are accepted and lived
by within a wide community of believers. That is why, aside from questions
of politeness, the Great Pumpkin is felt to be a good example of an absurd
belief, while the others are not. And the reason why community embedding
is felt to make an epistemic difference is that it is in our communities that
we discover our epistemic frames of reference, and live our doxastic lives.
So I suggest that the belief that a man long ago dead regularly returns in
substance is epistemically permissible because embedded in a wide community
of believers, while the Great Pumpkin has no such following. For the same
reason belief in democracy is epistemically justified, even if evidence-free.
There are no precise rules to determine how widely a belief must be believed in and lived by in order to be epistemically proper, when rock-bottom.
I dare suggest that epistemological rules regarding what is epistemically
acceptable are themselves community-embedded, most typically in communities of philosophers. And the community'S own sense of itself, and its
purposes, shapes its attitude on these matters. Thus variations will be expected on views as to the extent to which a belief must be widely held in
order to be considered epistemically acceptable.
Well, then, what of voodoo and astrology. Are they not widely held and
lived by? Certainly. So are they too epistemically respectable? The predilection to answer in the negative lies in the fact, I believe, that what we object
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to in these practises is their making empirical predictions contradicted by the
senses and science. Given the epistemologies of most of us, this makes them
unacceptable. And it is this feature which makes them so readily available as
obvious examples of improper beliefs. And the same may be said of belief in
the Great Pumpkin if taken as out and out empirical. Of course the same may
be said of religious teachings with empirical import at odds with the senses
and science, from the point of view, at least, of a non-religious epistemology.
The fact is, though, that neither the Buddha's appearances, nor Elijah's visits,
nor the transubstantiation are empirical in nature.
Hence, our rejection of voodoo and astrology does not count as a counterexample to the epistemic respectability of widely held beliefs. We merely
need require that widely held beliefs not be admitted if they contradict the
evidence of the senses or scientific truths.
Thus I see no reason to think that if religious epistemology were recognized
as acceptable, then just any belief could be acceptable, no matter how little
believed and no matter how much it went against our sense judgements and
well established scientific truths.
We have now considered, and attempted to turn back, two reasons why a
religious epistemology, as I have described it, might be rejected as epistemically defective. The first was from considerations of a link between truth and
epistemic justification, and the second was from the fear that if religious
epistemology were granted epistemic respectability, just any belief would
have to be similarly regarded.
But suppose, despite my best efforts, the epistemic respectability of religious epistemology, as here presented, was rejected in the name of a rule-epistemology. What would then be the epistemic situation for one who embraced
a religious epistemology? Anyone holding a rule-epistemology would be
perfectly within his rights to require religious belief to answer to the requirements of his epistemology. What needs to be stressed, though, is that the
holding of a rock-bottom religious belief takes place on the same epistemological level as the holding of a rule-epistemology. To put the point differently, just as the rule-epistemologist may think that rule-epistemology has the
right to judge religion, the religious believer may equally believe that religion
has the right to judge rule-epistemology.
What is impermissible, I suggest, is for the rule-epistemologist to assume
that her epistemological stance is somehow of a more fundamental order than
is another's religious stance.
In fact, the situation between a religious epistemology and a rule-epistemology is exactly analogous to the situation that obtains between one religion
and another within religious diversity. Thus a rule-epistemologist could not
very well cling to her own epistemological orientation, discounting all others,
while denying the same right of one religious orientation to discount all the
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others. She couldn't very well do that, that is, unless she preferred her own
rule-epistemology without having made it pass any rule.
And so, to conclude the argument of this study, while I have not established
that rock-bottom strongly prior religious belief is epistemically justified, I hope
to have said enough to show that there is no good reason to think it is not. 28 • 29
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